The colour of the global crisis of antibiotic resistance is red (if te Gram stain is your reference). In rich countries we have ESBL-producing Enterobacterales (mainly E. coli), but the real problem are carbapenemase-producing strains (Klebsiella, Pseudomonas and Acinetobacter) that are already endemic in lower and middle-income countries. The unanswered question is “where did these resistant bacteria come from”? Animals or bathrooms? Continue reading
CRE
CPE infection prevention and control guidelines: an update
Since writing this 2015 review on gaps and controversies in the guidelines for the prevention and control of CPE (and other MDR-GNR) I’ve tried to keep it fairly up to date. So, here’s the latest iteration, including the 2015 CDC guidelines.
The infinite trio from South Africa
Last week I had the pleasure of attending the 8th FIDSSA Congress in Johannesburg (Federation of Infectious Diseases Societies of Southern Africa). I was invited to talk on infection control in the Netherlands, SDD and empiric antibiotic strategies in ICU. I never felt more distance between my habitat and that of my hosts. It surpassed the 3732 miles in the air. I learned a lot; from how it is to go into military conflict areas to identify Ebola cases, fighting a cholera outbreak after a tropical cyclone in Mozambique to the infinite trio, which stands for carbapenem resistant Klebsiella, Pseudomonas and Acinetobacter. Continue reading
CPE carriage – once positive, always positive…or maybe not?
I blogged recently about the new ESCMID guidelines on resistant Gram-negative carriage and decolonisation, which supported a “once positive, always positive” approach to CPE carriers due to the lack of effective decolonisation options. A new study suggests that a large majority (75%) of patients who were once identified as CPE carriers no longer had CPE detectable when they were readmitted. This has implications for the management of CPE carriers in hospitals.
Infection prevention and control practices for CPE in Ontario, Canada – are we doing enough?
We’re delighted to have this guest post from Dr Alainna Jamal (bio below)…
Hello from Canada! In this blog post, I’ll reflect on findings from a study by our group (the Toronto Invasive Bacterial Diseases Network), published in this month’s issue of Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol.
21 is the magic number (for defining CPE person-to-person transmission using WGS)
A fascinating study from a European research group has unravelled the molecular epidemiology of a large European collection of carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella pneumoniae clinical isolates. Most carbapenem resistance was due to an acquired carbapenemases, transmission clusters were common within and between hospitals, carbapenemase-producing isolates are more likely to spread in hospitals, and 21 SNPs is the magic number for defining CPE person-to-person transmission using WGS.
The war against CPE
An interesting publication on the control of CPE last week. Not in Nature, Science of Journal of Hospital Infection, but in the “Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden”. The paper, “Besluit van 26 april 2019, houdende aanpassing van het Besluit publieke gezondheid vanwege een meldingsplicht voor Carbapenemaseproducerende Enterobacteriaceae”, with King Willem-Alexander as first author, implies that on April 26th it was decided that from July 1st 2019 on, by law, all CPE detected in the Netherlands must be notified, see. A next step in our war against CPE.
Make sure a (CPE) iceberg doesn’t sink your ship
An interesting modelling study has quantified the size of the CPE iceberg lurking under the water when CPE is only detected by clinical cultures and no active screening is done. And the CPE iceberg is larger than you may think!
Who’s looking for CPE in English hospitals?
A team of authors surveyed NHS acute hospitals in England to determine the approach to CPE detection, including laboratory methods. The findings provide an opportunity to compare the approach to CPE detection and prevalence nationally, identifying higher CPE prevalence in the North-West, North-East and the South-East (the region that includes London) of England. The findings also suggest that more screening for CPE would detect more carriers – and perhaps help to prevent a silent epidemic of CPE in some regions.
Can we ever de-isolate CPE carriers?
One of the questions that we often ask ourselves is whether carriers of CPE (and other MDR-GNR) can de-isolated. Most of the guidelines are pretty non-committal on this point due to lack of evidence. Some new guidelines from ESCMID-EUCIC address this issue head on. But, unfortunately, the answer is that de-isolation of CPE carriers, particularly over the course of a single hospitalisation, isn’t going to work because there’s no effective decolonisation method.
Reflections on Infection Prevention and Control 